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Throughout the decades-long debate on the so-
called ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU, it has often 
been claimed that not only the European 
Parliament but also national parliaments should 
play a stronger role in the EU decision-making 
process. For the followers of the ‘de-
parliamentarisation thesis’, the erosion of the 
power of national assemblies, the most direct 
representation of citizens, would have created a 
legitimacy gap that the European Parliament has 
not been able to fill, despite taking progressive 
steps to that end. 
European Treaties have progressively 
acknowledged the role of national parliaments 
and thereby the principle of dual legitimacy 
(Piedrafita, 2013). However, both the perceptions 
of the necessity to increase the involvement of 
national parliaments and the opinions on the 
control mechanisms over EU policymaking exist 
in a multitude of shades, possibly reflecting 
diverging democratic traditions and 
parliamentary practices across the EU. 
Nevertheless, in the context of the eurozone 
economic crisis, several developments may have 
reinforced the sentiment that the principle of dual 
legitimacy in the EU should be fostered (Stratulat 
& al, 2014). Firstly, acting as the highest executive 
body, the European Council played a major role 
in the context of the crisis and Euro summits 
were also created (between 2010 and 2013, the 
European Council convened 24 times, and 5 
Euro summits took place). But, unaccountable as 
a whole, the European Council can only derive its 
legitimacy from national parliaments. Secondly, 
intergovernmental Treaties requiring (national) 
parliamentary ratifications were adopted (the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG), the Treaty on the 
Given their limited involvement in EU 
affairs, the Belgian parliaments at the 
different levels of the Belgian federation 
barely contribute to the legitimation 
process of the EU’s actions. In order to 
strengthen their role, not only should 
governmental communication towards 
parliaments be improved but 
parliamentary activities should also 
adapt to the confederal features of 
Belgium. The latter poses a unique 
challenge in Europe. 
  
European Stability Mechanism and – currently 
under negotiation – the treaty for the creation of 
a Single Resolution Fund). Finally, despite being 
adopted by the European Parliament, legislation 
strengthening European economic governance 
(six-pack, two-pack) does not grant any 
significant role to the European Parliament. At 
the same time, this strengthened economic 
governance directly impacts the sovereignty of 
national parliaments, and the EU institutions 
have tried to arouse the enthusiasm of national 
parliaments for recommendations in favour of 
structural reform at the national level.  
This Brief, which will proceed based on the 
assumption that national parliaments should 
indeed be more involved in EU affairs, will focus 
on the consequences of such a claim for the 
Belgian parliamentary system. It first discusses 
the most direct mechanisms of involvement of 
Belgian parliaments, and the extent of their use. 
We will see that the control currently exercised by 
the Belgian parliaments over the main executive 
bodies of the EU – the European Commission, 
the European Council and the Council of the 
European Union – is very limited, as is their 
practical involvement in the approval of Treaties 
(part II). In a second step, we will investigate the 
main factors impeding the capacity of Belgian 
parliaments to act and what could be done to 
potentially mitigate their effects (part III). But 
first of all, we will underline the relevant 
peculiarities of Belgian federalism, an 
understanding of which is essential to the study 
of the meaning and role of ‘national parliaments’ 
within the Belgian political system (part I). 
I. ON INTERNAL COORDINATION AND 
PARLIAMENTARISM IN THE BELGIAN 
FEDERAL STATE 
In the EU Treaties – or in the extensive literature 
on the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU – the 
mention of ‘national parliaments’ seems to 
implicitly refer to the classical unicameral or 
bicameral concepts of parliamentary systems 
(Dopagne & Delpérée, 2010). However, neither 
of these conceptions apply to the parliamentary 
system of the Belgian federal state. To lift the 
ambiguity of the term ‘national parliaments’ used 
in the Lisbon Treaty, Belgium actually deemed it 
necessary to include annexed Declaration 51 
stating that ‘not only the Chamber of Representatives 
and Senate of the Federal Parliament but also the 
parliamentary assemblies of the Communities and the 
Regions act, in terms of the competences exercised by the 
Union, as components of the national parliamentary 
system or chambers of the national Parliament.’ 
The degree of involvement in EU affairs of these 
multiple Belgian ‘national parliaments’ (up to 9) 
is in turn intrinsically linked to how the executives 
of the Federal State, the Regions and the 
Communities coordinate their views on EU 
affairs in order to define a single ‘Belgian’ 
position – the only one recognised by the EU. 
This coordination mechanism is regulated by a 
cooperation agreement drawn up in 1994 
following the fourth reform of the Belgian State 
that constitutionalized its federal character.1 The 
agreement also specifies how the Representation 
of Belgium in the Council of the EU is shared 
between the federal, regional or community level 
according to their respective competences.  
According to the terms of this cooperation 
agreement, in order to define the Belgian position 
at the Council of the EU, systematic horizontal 
coordination takes place within the Directorate-
General Europe (DGE) of the Ministry of 
Foreign affairs which presides and provides the 
secretariat for the meetings, and more generally 
ensures that ‘the principles and coherence of the 
European policy of Belgium are respected’.2 A multitude 
of officials are consistently invited to the 
meetings: members of the cabinets of (i) the 
ministers of the ruling federal coalition (thus 
representing the Prime minister and the vice-
Prime Ministers), (ii) the federal State Secretary 
for European Affairs, (iii) the Presidents (head of 
  
government) of the different regions and 
communities, as well as (iv) regional or 
community ministers with a portfolio that 
includes international affairs. Depending on the 
agenda of the meeting, are also invited members 
of the cabinet of functionally competent regional 
and community ministers as well as some civil 
servants of those same ministries. They can also 
include members of the Belgian permanent 
representation (federal civil servants or 
regional/community level attachés). On average, 
of the hundred individuals potentially involved, 
around twenty attend each meeting. 
Although it might seem that this mechanism 
could foster competition in the Belgian federal 
system, as multiple negotiators hold veto rights, 
it was unequivocally demonstrated that this 
coordination mechanism actually fosters 
cooperation (Beyers and Bursens, 2006). 
Consensus is nearly always found at the DGE 
level, and very rarely requires the involvement of 
the formal higher inter-ministerial instances, 
namely the Inter-ministerial Committee for 
External Affairs or, as a last resort, the 
Concertation Committee. 
For the purpose of this Brief, two important 
preliminary observations can be made. Firstly, the 
intergovernmental and horizontal nature of this 
cooperation between the executives leaves little 
room for the parliaments to influence the Belgian 
position that will be officially endorsed in the EU 
institutions – we will come back to this. And 
secondly, this coordination mechanism reflects 
the constitutional equal-footing on which the 
federal level and the federated levels are placed. 
This feature affects the relevance of the 
comparison with the parliamentary practices of 
other federal countries (Germany, Austria) or 
countries with a very decentralised system (Spain) 
because, unlike Belgium, these countries depend 
on a hierarchy between the federal/central level 
and the sub-entities (Boronska-Hryniewiecka, 
2013). In other words, no other European 
country has gone as far as Belgium down the path 
of confederalism (Schock, 2004) and this affects 
the scope of parliamentary action in European 
affairs. 
II. HOW BELGIAN PARLIAMENTS DEAL 
WITH EU AFFAIRS 
Let us now examine the involvement of Belgian 
parliaments in the ratification process of 
European Treaties (A), as well as how and to 
what extent they use the ‘early warning 
mechanism’ and ‘political dialogue’ to control the 
European Commission (B), and control the 
Belgian position within the European Council (C) 
and within the Council of the EU (D). 
A. Assenting to Treaties 
Belgian Regions and Communities (federated 
entities) were granted important constitutional 
rights to conceive and adopt international 
treaties.3 Most European treaties concern both 
the federal and federated entities and thus once 
they have been negotiated and signed, all Belgian 
parliaments need to assent to these treaties for 
the ratification process to be complete.4 The 
procedure does take some time, as evidenced by 
the time it took for the TSCG to successfully go 
through all nine parliaments in 2013.  
In principle, the veto of a single parliament would 
prevent Belgium from ratifying the Treaty. 
Because of this, the parliaments of the federated 
entities were granted maximal authority. From a 
European perspective, this could create absurd 
situations if, for example, the parliament of the 
German Community representing 80.000 citizens 
rejected a Treaty requiring the unanimous 
approval of all Member States.  
Although parliaments can only approve or reject 
the Treaty as a whole without being able to 
suggest amendments, they are made aware of any 
negotiations for EU Treaty revisions as soon as 
  
they begin and receive the draft Treaty before it 
is signed.5 In principle, all the Belgian assemblies 
could therefore weigh in on the Belgian position 
in the midst of the negotiations but in truth their 
influence is hardly felt at all (Dumont, 2013). The 
debate on the recent TSCG suggests that 
parliaments were not truly involved in the process 
and mostly found themselves faced with the ‘fait 
accompli’, as was also the case elsewhere in 
Europe. 
B. Monitoring of the principle of 
subsidiarity and political dialogue with the 
European Commission 
The measure of control a national parliament 
holds over the initiatives taken by the European 
Commission depends on two processes: the 
control of the principle of subsidiarity and the so-
called ‘political dialogue’. The first process must 
be understood as the control of the subsidiarity 
principle as defined by the Protocol No 2 of the 
Lisbon Treaty via the so-called ‘early warning 
mechanism’, a tool allowing any member 
parliament to submit a reasoned opinion stating 
why it considers that a draft legislative act does 
not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Two votes are granted to the national parliaments 
of each Member State. If the number of opinions 
that find there is a breach of the subsidiarity 
principle exceeds the agreed threshold, the 
proposal must be reviewed, although the 
Commission can decide not to make any 
changes.6 
The second process, the ‘political dialogue’, is an 
extension of this procedure. It results from the 
Commission’s 2006 initiative to allow a national 
parliament to express itself beyond the sole and 
strict subsidiarity principle. This unilateral, 
informal and non-binding initiative of the 
Commission aims to give national parliaments 
the possibility of voicing their broader opinion 
and concerns to the Commission, at an early stage 
of the European decision-making process. 
In order to implement Protocol No 2 of the 
Lisbon Treaty and in keeping with Declaration 51 
of Belgium, Belgian parliaments concluded a 
‘cooperation agreement’ which regulates how the 
two national votes are shared, namely on the basis 
of their respective competences.7 However, this 
improvised agreement has strictly no legal value 
and has not entered into force (Delpérée and 
Dopagne, 2010). Nevertheless, the parliaments 
behave according to this informal political 
agreement. The very limited use of the ‘early 
warning mechanism’ probably explains why this 
informality has yet to create any problems. 
Indeed, since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the Belgian parliaments have barely used 
the mechanism. Considered as a whole, the 
Belgian parliamentary system is one of the least 
active in Europe in its use of the early warning 
mechanism. On average since 2010, Belgian 
parliaments were responsible for 1.4% of all the 
contributions from national parliaments across 
Europe.8 
The most active Belgian assembly is the federal 
Chamber of Representatives. Out of the 
thousand documents it receives from the 
European Commission every year, about a 
hundred are included in a consolidated summary 
which includes a preliminary analysis of the 
respect of the subsidiarity principle. Three civil 
servants of the European cell of the Chamber are 
assigned to this task. This summary is then sent 
to the competent permanent parliamentary 
committee, which can express its own opinion or 
potentially refer it to the plenary. Since 2010, the 
Chamber issued 25 opinions on legislative 
proposals by the Commission, four of which can 
be strictly considered as reasoned opinions on the 
subsidiarity principle.9 Two of these reasoned 
opinions were negative, one of which pertained 
to the Monti II legislative proposal regarding the 
right to strike, which was greeted by 19 negative 
votes coming from 12 chambers across Europe 
  
and was eventually withdrawn by the 
Commission.10 
Other assemblies barely used the mechanism. 
The Senate issued three opinions since 2010 
including a negative one that discussed the 
question of subsidiarity specifically.11 Regional 
parliaments made an even more limited use of 
these procedures. The Flemish Parliament issued 
an opinion as part of the political dialogue in 
2013.12 The Walloon Parliament used the system 
only once in 2010, mostly to try it out.13 
C. Control of the Belgian position at the 
European Council 
The Belgian position in the European Council 
can in principle be debated within the ‘Federal 
advisory committee on European affairs’ (the 
Committee) which associates ten members of the 
Chamber of Representatives, ten members of the 
Senate and ten Belgian Members of the European 
Parliament. The public hearing of the Prime 
Minister before and after the European Council 
constitutes the most visible and substantial 
activity of the Committee. 
Although these hearings are not systematic, the 
custom is mostly observed, which makes Belgium 
a Member State where the frequency of such 
hearings is relatively high (Hefftler et al., 2013). 
We can estimate that about a dozen individuals 
coming from both federal chambers attend these 
meetings. Belgian MEPs rarely show up, either 
because their agenda does not allow them to or 
because they do not find the meeting useful 
enough given the other information means at 
their disposal. It should also be noted that some 
parliamentarians that are not formally members 
of the EU affairs committee regularly participate 
in these hearings. 
This informal character of the meetings reflects 
the informative rather than deliberative intrinsic 
nature of the Committee. The hearing is 
therefore similar to an information session where 
the Prime Minister begins by making a statement, 
followed by a series of comments and questions 
from the assembly. The Prime Minister in turn 
tries to answer them in the few closing minutes 
of the meeting. In practice, the Committee does 
not voice any form of statement regarding the 
Belgian position that the Prime Minister intends 
to defend at the European Council. This does not 
result from the impossibility of doing so since the 
Committee could adopt ‘opinions, proposal for 
resolutions, recommendations or other final texts that are 
then submitted […] to the plenary […]’.14 In the past, 
resolutions were directed at Treaty revisions, and 
almost never in relation to a session of the 
European Council.15  
D. Control of the Belgian position at the 
Council of the EU 
Belgian parliaments also have the possibility of 
controlling and influencing the Belgian position 
that will ultimately be put forward in the Council 
of the EU. They may do so by scrutinising 
proposals of legislative acts as well as non-
legislative documents published by the European 
Institutions. Influence can be exercised with 
classical instruments of parliamentary control: by 
putting questions to the government, organising 
debates, bringing forward proposals for the 
adoption of resolutions, etc. 
The rules of the House of Representatives 
mention that ‘each permanent committee includes in its 
monthly agenda an exchange of views on European affairs 
that concern it and that are also included in the agenda of 
the Council of the European Union […]’16 Each 
Committee also selects a ‘europromotor’ from 
among its members whose mission is to follow 
European issues of relevance to the Committee, 
and to act in favour of their inclusion in the 
agenda of the Committee. The Flemish 
Parliament and the Parliament of the French 
Community adopted a somewhat similar concept 
of ‘europromotor’.17 
  
Although in practice it is difficult to evaluate the 
degree of control of parliaments in EU affairs, it 
is obvious that their involvement is quite limited 
as a whole. Hearings of ministers before and after 
the meetings of the Council of the EU are far 
from systematic. Although it must in principle do 
so, the government also fails to systematically 
provide an annotated agenda before each 
Council, and to report on it afterwards. 
According to an analysis made by the services of 
the House of Representatives, less than 5% of 
parliamentary questions have a link with EU 
affairs (D’Hollander, 2013). The system of 
europromotors cannot apparently be considered 
as adequate and satisfactory in this respect.18 
Delreux and Randour (2013) report that only 5 
questions regarding EU affairs were asked in the 
plenary in 2012, but that none of them dealt 
specifically with a legislative proposal. They also 
state that the few questions asked in the 
permanent parliamentary committees concern 
major orientations of EU policy rather than 
specific legislative acts to be debated in the 
Council of the EU.  
III. OVERCOMING THE MAIN FACTORS 
BEHIND THE LIMITED INVOLVEMENT OF 
BELGIAN PARLIAMENTS INTO EU AFFAIRS 
What are the main reasons for the limited 
involvement and influence of Belgian parliaments 
in European affairs discussed so far? We can 
broadly distinguish between three main reasons.  
A. Belgian political system and pro-
Europeanism 
In Belgium, coalition government typically relies 
on a docile parliamentary majority, made possible 
by strong party discipline and homogeneity 
within parliamentary groups. The negative 
connotation of ‘particracy’ is often associated 
with this regime in which parties can exercise a 
great deal of control. De facto, one of the main 
characteristics of the Belgian political system is 
thus the control of the executive on the 
legislature, rather than vice versa (Delreux and 
Randour, 2013). The activities of parliaments on 
European Affairs are no exception. 
Moreover, Belgian political parties (at least the 
‘traditional’ parties – and by extension the 
majority of parliamentary groups) are very much 
pro-European. This consensus tends to work 
against any debate on EU affairs. Political parties 
do not take positions on EU affairs because the 
overall Belgian public opinion strongly favours 
European integration. Parties are not pressed to 
take a stance on EU affairs in the public arena, 
including and starting with parliamentary 
assemblies (Delreux and Randour, 2013). 
However, if the Belgian political system and the 
widely shared pro-Europeanism can explain the 
limited involvement of Belgian parliaments in EU 
affairs, this should not justify it. Even if pro-
Europeanism dominates the political landscape, 
it could be concealing starkly divided views on 
the future of European integration. For example, 
it is noteworthy that some extremely ambitious 
blueprints put forward by the EU institutions on 
the future of the Economic and Monetary Union 
were barely discussed within Belgian parliaments. 
This absence of public deliberation certainly 
prevents these political opinions from being 
clarified.  
B. Adapting parliamentarism to the 
coordination of the executives in the Belgian 
federation 
As mentioned in part I, the role of parliaments is 
heavily constrained in the Belgian institutional 
system where the executives of the federal, 
regional and community levels of the federation 
dominate the decision-making process on EU 
affairs. Parliaments are excluded from the 
internal coordination process that is exclusively 
conducted by governments and the 
  
administration. Greater parliamentary 
involvement is therefore conceivable either 
before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) this internal 
coordination takes places. 
Ex-ante – Prior to internal coordination 
Ex-ante, the parliaments get a chance to express 
their views on EU proposals to their respective 
federal/regional/community governments, just 
as they have the opportunity to do so with the 
Commission within the political dialogue 
framework. This approach supposes that 
parliaments may influence the position of a 
specific government before it enters into the 
Belgian internal coordination process, as soon as 
EU documents are made available.  
Such an ex-ante involvement is however bound to 
be quite demanding for parliamentary assemblies. 
Deprived of the official stance of the executive, 
they would have to switch from reactivity to 
proactivity. This would require the member of 
parliament to have an impressive array of skills 
and abilities: a sound technical understanding of 
the topic at hand, the capacity of detecting the 
politically salient aspects of EU proposals, and a 
good grasp of the respective competences of 
federal or federated entities. This proactivity 
would also require the right amount of support 
from parliamentary services. This kind of support 
would require closer attention to be paid to the 
organisation and capabilities of parliaments, thus 
promoting and giving them the means for greater 
involvement in EU affairs.  
Moreover, this proposal for more ex-ante 
involvement raises a fundamental question: 
would the greater degree of involvement of 
parliaments not undermine the capacity of the 
entities of the Belgian State to forge compromises 
in the internal negotiation process when 
diverging interests are at stake? This fundamental 
question not only reflects a classical equilibrium 
between legitimacy and efficiency, in Belgium, 
this question also touches upon the tension 
between the respect of the external autonomy of 
federated entities and the need to safeguard the 
coherence of the Belgian external positioning. 
Ex-post – After internal coordination 
The possibility for ex-post control of the Belgian 
position runs into the issue of the fragmentation 
of the parliaments in the multi-level and largely 
non-hierarchical structure of Belgium.19 First, 
there is no single government responsible for the 
Belgian position. This position is always the result 
of a coordination process between all 
governments that compose the Belgian State. 
Secondly and as a result, no parliamentary 
assembly is entitled to control this position. An 
assembly representing all levels of the federations 
where the concerted Belgian position as a whole 
could be jointly discussed, controlled and 
influenced, simply does not exist in Belgium. In 
principle, the Federal Chamber may only control 
the federal government’s position, the Flemish 
government the Flemish position, the Walloon 
Parliament the Walloon position, etc. While the 
executives and the bureaucracy from all levels 
regularly convene – in working groups, at the DG 
E and other inter-ministerial fora – in order to 
define a single Belgian position, parliamentarians 
from the federal, regional and community levels 
do not convene to jointly control that single 
Belgian position.  
In this respect, the reform of the Senate 
undertaken as part of the sixth reform of the 
Belgian State will not facilitate parliamentary 
control over EU affairs, quite to the contrary. If 
the Senate will indeed become a chamber of 
‘federated entities’ as Senators will come directly 
from the regional and community Parliaments, it 
was essentially designed as a forum for future 
institutional reforms in Belgium.20 The Senate will 
be stripped of most of its external affairs 
competences and will not be entitled to approve 
international treaties anymore. As a non-
  
permanent body, the Senate will in any case not 
be able to control the government. Whether the 
participation of senators to the federal EU Affairs 
Committee will be maintained is also uncertain. 
In sum, the federal level is evolving more towards 
a unicameral system than towards a bicameral 
federal system that would be of particular 
relevance to the external affairs of the Belgian 
federation, and EU affairs in particular. 
If these constraints cannot be ignored, practical 
and partial solutions can nevertheless be 
advocated to circumvent the problem. For 
example, stronger parliamentary control can be 
promoted within the federal Chamber on mostly 
federal competences for EU affairs (notably in 
areas such as: General Affairs, Ecofin, Justice and 
Home Affairs, Energy, Telecom, Employment, 
Social Policy, Consumer Affairs). In these cases, 
members of the federal Chamber would in 
principle be entitled to act as the resulting Belgian 
position is mostly federal. Accordingly, it would be 
advisable to organise hearings of the Finance 
Minister on the decisions to be taken at the 
Governing Council of the European Stability 
Mechanism,21 and within the Eurogroup which 
gained pre-eminence during the crisis. Likewise, 
the Flemish Parliament is most clearly entitled to 
have a say on the stance of the Flemish 
government regarding fisheries. 
However, in the numerous ‘mixed’ areas where 
both the federal and regional/community levels 
are concerned, parliamentary dialogue with their 
respective government on the concerted Belgian 
position cannot be anything but informative. For 
example, the regional Walloon minister of the 
economy could inform Walloon deputies about 
the Belgian position on a proposal to be 
discussed in the Competitiveness Council. But in 
no possible way are regional deputies entitled to 
control, influence or change a Belgian position 
that has already been determined and concerns 
the two other regions in addition to the federal 
level. 
C. Improving governmental communication 
with parliaments 
The quality and relevance of the information at 
the disposal of the parliamentarians is crucial for 
effective control to take place. However, the 
parliament is usually poorly informed about the 
position a government intends to adopt when it 
concerns European affairs,  
Wherever stronger parliamentary scrutiny is 
considered, better governmental communication 
is required. Information on the result of internal 
coordination meetings could turn out useful. An 
increased number of regular hearings, both 
before and after the Council of the EU takes 
place would be advisable. 
Belgium could learn much from the Netherlands 
where one well-established practice consists in 
the government systematically sending out a 
report at an early stage and with the support of its 
administration which not only summarises every 
proposition of the Commission but also specifies 
what the respective Dutch position will be 
(Beoordeling Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen (BNC) 
fiche).22 The information also specifies 
administrative and budgetary consequences as 
well as a first analysis regarding the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. Moreover, 
before attending the Council, the Dutch Minister 
sends a letter specifying his or her intention (an 
annotated agenda) and a report is also provided 
for the Parliament after the Council. Of course, 
the information does not necessarily contain 
extremely salient Dutch positions, but the 
process undoubtedly increases the visibility of the 
EU proposals currently being discussed for the 
members of parliament. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Brief, we underlined that Belgian 
parliaments – understood as all nine assemblies 
composing the Belgian parliamentary system – 
are barely involved in EU affairs. Therefore they 
  
can hardly be considered as contributing to the 
legitimation process of EU action. Although all 
its assemblies have to give assent to European 
Treaties as they are touching upon both federal 
and regional or community competences (bar the 
Senate that will lose all Treaty assent 
competences following the sixth Belgian state 
reform), in practice their veto right cannot 
compensate for the lack of early involvement and 
debate. Besides, Belgian parliaments were not 
much active in their use of the instruments that 
the EU put at their disposal such as the early 
warning mechanism for the control of the 
subsidiarity principle, and by extension the 
‘political dialogue’ with the Commission. There is 
very little parliamentary follow-up on the 
proposals from EU institutions, even when they 
display some political salience and relevance for 
Belgium. Accordingly, the influence of the 
Belgian parliamentary system on the Belgian 
position defended in the Council of the EU and 
the European Council is almost non-existent. 
One major consideration underlined in this Brief 
is that the kind of federalism that developed in 
Belgium significantly restrains the potential 
involvement of the elected assemblies. First, the 
federal and federated levels (and thus political 
parties across levels) have to coordinate their 
views in order to define a unique Belgian position 
to defend at the EU level. Belgian assemblies are 
de jure excluded from this coordination 
mechanism which takes place exclusively within 
the executive and the administration. Moreover, 
the Belgian parliaments are de facto deprived from 
much of their control capability and influence 
before and after this coordination takes place. 
This follows from the simple consideration that 
no single government of the Belgian federation 
can in principle be fully held accountable for the 
Belgian position as a whole since it is always the 
concerted position among all entities of the 
federation. Moreover, no single parliamentary 
assembly is entitled to control this position. 
Notably, the reform of the Senate further 
deprives the federal level of a possible forum able 
to ensure collective oversight on the Belgian 
position in EU affairs.  
Despite the difficulties imposed by the strong 
confederate features of the internal decision-
making process on EU affairs, the Belgian 
parliaments could still develop their influence. 
They could mostly do so at an early stage, before 
the internal coordination (ex-ante), in the first 
weeks following the publication of legislative or 
non-legislative acts by the EU institutions. They 
would thereby seize the opportunity to voice 
their opinion not only to the Commission but 
also to their respective governments. At a later 
stage, once the internal coordination process has 
defined a Belgian position (ex-post), stronger 
control by the Chamber of Representatives 
should particularly be possible on the matters of 
mostly federal competences both before and after 
a Council of the EU. This would in any case 
require much better communication between the 
government and the Chamber on its position 
than current standards. A greater degree of 
involvement would also require that 
parliamentary groups of the governmental 
majority take up a more leading role in the 
debates on EU affairs, rather than leaving it all 
out to the executive. They would however need 
to so without jeopardizing the effectiveness of 
the Belgian internal coordination system, where 
cooperation is essential. Only the realisation that 
EU affairs cannot be narrowly defined as external 
policy affairs, but rather as internal policies with 
a European dimension, may entice parliaments to 
redefine their role in this respect. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 ‘Accord de coopération entre l'Etat fédéral, les Communautés et les Régions, relatif à la représentation du 
Royaume de Belgique au sein du Conseil de Ministres de l'Union européenne’ (M.B. 17.11.1994). In practice, the 
agreement also followed the insertion of art.146 of the Maastricht Treaty (currently art. 16 TFUE) which states 
that “The Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, authorized to commit 
the government of that Member State”. This mention reflected the demand of federated entities of Belgium (and 
Germany) that aimed to introduce a decentralized system of representation of a Member State in the Council of 
Ministers. 
2 In Point 5 in the development of the Cooperation Agreement op.cit. 1. 
3 Art.167 (3) of the Belgian Constitution allows Regions and Communities to conclude Treaties on Matters for 
which their Parliament are competent. 
4 Following the sixth reform of the Belgian State, and its entry into force after the elections of May 2014, the 
Senate will not have to approve the so-called mixed Treaties anymore. Hence, eight instead of nine Parliamentary 
assemblies will have to approve them. Initially considered, the possibility that the ‘new’ Senate, now directly 
representing the federated entities, would consent to the mixed Treaties in place of Regional and Community 
parliaments was finally not retained. This largely reflects the difficulty for federated entities to grant back to the 
federal level the veto rights they acquired. 
See Dumont (2013) p.39 for a summary of how so called ‘mixed Treaties’ are negotiated (internally), how Belgian 
delegation for the negotiation is defined and the modalities for their signature.  
5 Art. 168 of the Belgian Constitution for the federal Chambers, and Art. 16 §2 (2), of the Special Law of 8a August 
1980 for regional and community Parliaments. 
6 The following table summarizes the early warning mechanism procedure. Taken from Piedrafita (2013). 
 ‘Yellow card’ procedure ‘Orange card’ procedure  
Only for ordinary legislative procedure 
Threshold A number of negative opinions 
representing: 
• at least 1/3 of the total votes (2 votes 
per MS) or 
• ¼ for legislative acts concerning the 
area of freedom, security and justice 
A number of negative opinions representing 
at least a simple majority of the votes 
allocated to national parliaments 
Effect The initiating EU institution (usually 
the Commission) must review the 
proposal. It can maintain, amend or 
withdraw it. 
The European Commission must review the 
proposal, and it can maintain, amend or withdraw it. 
If the European Commission decides to maintain the 
proposal, it has to justify its decision, and both the 
Council and the European Parliament can reject it 
  
before the end of the first reading if they find it 
incompatible with the subsidiarity principle. 
7 The agreement signed by the presidents of 8 different parliaments in 2005 (in prevision of the Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe) specifies that when one competent parliament submits a reasoned opinion, one vote is 
cast. When several competent parliaments submit a reasoned opinion, the total of the votes is split according to 
their domain of competence. When the proposal for a legislative act is linked to an exclusive federal competence, 
the two federal chambers maintain their capacity to cast the two votes. If the proposal is linked to the competences 
of regions and communities, “two votes are cast when at least two competent parliaments from a different 
linguistic regime communicate a reasoned opinion”. For a topic where a parliament is exclusively competent it can 
express the two votes (in practice the Flemish Parliament on fisheries). Finally, when the legislative project has a 
‘mixed’ nature as it concerns both the federal and the regional/community levels, “two votes are cast when at least 
one federal chamber and one regional/community parliament submit a reasoned opinion”. The agreement also 
foresee that the Council of State would litigate in case of a disagreement regarding the respective competence of 
a parliament to submit a reasoned opinion. 
The ‘agreement’ can be found in the annexes of rules of procedure of the House of Representatives at: 
http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/publications/reglement/reglement_FR_bijlage_10_2010.indd.p
df 
8 Own calculation based on the data covering 2010-2013 provided by the Directorate for the Relations with 
National Parliaments, European Parliament, on its website: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/cms/pid/1876 (last consulted 14/02/2014). This is obviously a purely 
quantitative assessment. For example, the (hyper) activity (at least quantitatively) of the Italian Senate and the 
Portuguese Parliament makes them outliers in the dataset. 
9 Based on the IPEX database (www.IPEX.eu) and the dedicated page on the website of the Chamber of 
representatives at: 
http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?language=fr&section=/pri/europe&story=sub.xml&rightmen
u=right) (last consulted 21/02/2014) 
10 ‘Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services’ (COM 2012 (130). For the details on the procedure, see the 
page: http://oide.sejm.gov.pl/oide/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14765&Itemid=793 
and Fabrini and Granat (2013) 
11 Based on IPEX database and on the Senate database. 
12 The opinion was about a proposal establishing a framework on market access to port services and financial 
transparency of ports COM (2013) 296. See document Nr 2147 (2012-2013) 2 on the Flemish Parliament website 
at www.vlaamsparlement.be. 
13 The opinions were about directives COM2010 (94) and COM 2010(95), no objections were made, for more 
information see http://parlement.wallonie.be/content/default.php?p=eur_avis 
14 Art.68 (4) of the rules of procedure of the Chamber of Representatives (Règlement de la Chambre des 
représentants). Own translation. 
15 The last resolution adopted by the Chamber concerned the European Council of Laeken of 2001, see (Doc. Ch. 
50 1527/002). For the complete overview of the output of the Chamber on EU affairs, see: 
http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/pri/europe/RAPPORTS_19_10_2012.pdf 
16 Art.37 of the rules of procedure of the Chamber of Representatives (Règlement de la Chambre des 
représentants). Own translation. 
17 See Art 31 of Règlement intérieur du Parlement de la Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles and for the Flemish 
Parliament the following webpage: 
  
http://www.vlaamsparlement.be/vp/informatie/diensteuropa/beleidsdomein/algemeen/europromotoren.html. 
(last consulted 14/02/2014) 
18 See the comments made by Turtelboom, Chevalier, Vautmans and Dierickx in their proposal for a mofication 
of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Representatives concerning the follow-up of EU affairs. DOC 
Chambre 51 2337/001, 14 Marc 2006. 
19 This brief consideration could certainly be further explained by the plural and hesitant Belgian doctrine on 
federalism, which in general considers ‘sovereignty’ as relative concept in Belgium. See Piret (2007) for an overview. 
20 See Matthijs (2013) and Muyle (2013) for details on the Senate reform. 
21 A proposal for a resolution for control of the decision taken in the European Stability Mechanism was put 
forward without success in the Chamber. See the Chamber document n° 53 2103/001, ‘Proposition de résolution 
concernant le mandat de la Belgique au sein du Mécanisme Européen de Stabilité’, 14 march2012. 
22 For more information on this system, consult the dedicated pages on the Tweede Kamer website, at 
http://tweedekamer.nl/hoe_werkt_het/tweede_kamer_en_europa/nederlands_standpunt/index.jsp 
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